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ABSTRACT     
 Heterogeneity in firm productivity affects the location patterns of firm and agglomeration. 
Here we provide an economic geography model, involving forward and backward linkages 
driven by the migration of a footloose entrepreneur (capital owner) with different productivity. 
As a result we find a sorting equilibrium characterised by co-agglomeration of similar 
productivity firms, however, in contrast to previous studies, unproductive firms are more likely 
to agglomerate than their more productive counterparts. This is due to the increasingly severe 
competition induced by productive firms. Productive firms prevent severe local competition 
through their co-agglomeration. In terms of social welfare, although the sorting equilibrium 
involves higher social welfare than a perfectly symmetric pattern of firm location, the market 
outcome is sub-optimal and induces too much agglomeration.  
 
JEL F15, F23.  
Keywords: heterogeneous firms, footloose entrepreneurs, competition, productivity, 
economic geography 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Heterogeneity in firm productivity has recently been one of the most important issues in 
spatial aspects of economics. Not only economic researchers but also national governments and 
policy makers have drawn attention to how firm heterogeneity affects firm location and 
geographical concentration, and how high productivity firms can be attracted to a specific area 
to induce agglomeration in order to boost national average productivity (World Bank, 2009).  
There is some empirical evidence regarding firm heterogeneity and location patterns, for 
example the observation of a core region characterised by severe competition, which pushes 
lower productivity firms outwards towards the periphery (Syverson, 2004; Asplund and Nocke, 
2006). However the precise nature of the relationship between firm location and productivity is 
still ill-defined. As Duranton and Overman (2005) observe empirically, location patterns are 
highly heterogeneous across industries. In some sectors large scale firms are dispersed across 
regions while smaller firms are more concentrated geographically. They suggest that the spatial 
pattern is influenced by firm or sector characteristics and the way in which sectors/regions are 
classified. Furthermore, although dense areas are more productive than periphery in some cases, 
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this is less obvious, such as the example that downtown Detroit is more productive than suburbs 
such as Silicon Valley (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Similarly Au and Henderson (2005), using 
data on Chinese cities, found an inverted-U relationship between real wage per worker and 
urban size, which indicates that larger sized markets (cities) might not attract high productivity 
firms or might attract more low productivity firms.  
Based on the empirical evidence there might be another possible location pattern when firm 
productivity is heterogeneous. It can be hypothesised that productive firms cause severe local 
competition due to their lower prices and higher market share and thus they can deter co-
agglomeration in the large market and relocate from the large metropolitan area (core) to 
suburbs (periphery) while maintaining better access to the core region. Urban area locations 
sometimes cause firm to lower their productivity due to urban congestion effects, such as traffic 
jams, higher wage and higher land rents. These negative location factors might provide an 
incentive for productive firms to escape to the suburbs. It is important to study these negative 
urban congestion effects, but this paper explains firm location patterns by a “self-selection” 
mechanism, in which severe market competition, which is self-induced by productive firms, 
promotes their relocation to suburbs. Thus any urban congestion concerns and negative 
externalities are out of our scope. Our interest is in market competition caused by the 
geographical concentration of high productivity firms without any urban negative externalities. 
In order to investigate the hypothesis described, this paper studies the impact of firm 
heterogeneity on firm location in an economic geography model.   
1.1.  Literature Review and Our Model 
This paper constructs a simple model on the basis of recent advancements of two strands of 
literature. One strand surrounds the footloose entrepreneur (FE) model in the economic 
geography literature and the other is concerned with the heterogeneous-firm trade (HFT) model 
of Melitz (2003) in the international trade literature. 
The spatial aspects of economics have been discussed by the “new economic geography” 
models, initiated by the core-periphery (CP) model of Krugman (1991). These models study the 
relationship between trade costs and the location patterns of firms, agglomeration processes and 
the driving forces behind agglomeration and dispersion. However, the CP model has two weak 
aspects, first is its analytic intractability, the second is that it ignores heterogeneous firm 
productivity, which is our central focus in this paper.  
The first weakness has been resolved by models in subsequent studies. A set of models has 
been proposed which provide more tractable frameworks such as Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse   3
(2002). Forslid (1999) Forslid and Ottaviano (2002) and Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch.4) provide an 
analytically solvable version of CP model called the footloose entrepreneur (FE) model. The FE 
model involves the migration of capital owners (or entrepreneurs), which causes demand-linked 
circular causality driven by a migrant expenditure shift as well as cost-linked circular causality 
driven by a decreasing cost of living due to more local producers in an areas. Later, Pfluger 
(2004), successfully obtained a simpler model with more analytical solutions, providing the FE 
model with the quasi-linear utility function.
1 Since the quasi-linear utility function excludes 
income effects and dampens demand-linked circular causality the agglomeration effect weakens 
and catastrophic agglomeration never happens, resulting instead in a gradual agglomeration 
process via trade cost reduction. This paper adopts the FE model of Pfluger (2004) due to its 
tractability and simplicity as well as for the reasons described below.  
A technical reason for using the quasi-linear utility function model is that we conduct an 
intensive analysis of firm heterogeneity rather than labour heterogeneity and migration of the 
entrepreneur is a key factor. When firms are heterogeneous, or when entrepreneurs have a 
varying level of talent, capital returns, via migrant entrepreneurs’ income, vary across 
entrepreneurs. This would incur a heterogeneous income effect across entrepreneurs and a 
heterogeneous demand shift through their migration, resulting in a mixture of heterogeneous 
firms with heterogeneous labour migration. Thus the quasi-linear utility function reduces the 
heterogeneous demand/income effect in order to distinguish it from the previous demand/labour 
heterogeneity literature (e.g. Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002) and instead highlight the impact of firm 
heterogeneity on firm location and market competition.
2  Thus in this paper we require that 
entrepreneurs uniformly spend a unit of demand regardless of their income, although migration 
still creates demand linkages. A single firm production shift corresponds to a constant uniform 
shift of a unit of expenditure by a migrated entrepreneur. On the other hand, firms are 
heterogeneous and thus the impact of a production shift on competition and the cost of living is 
influenced by the location pattern of firms with varying productivities. Productive firms cause 
severe competition and improve the cost of living by lowering prices. For this reason, we adopt 
the FE model with a quasi-linear utility function. 
The second weakness, ignorance of firm heterogeneity, can be solved by incorporating the 
HFT model of Melitz (2003) into an economic geography model. The HFT models focus on the 
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links between firm productivity and export behaviour on the one hand and the impact of trade 
liberalisation on industry productivity on the other.
3 Melitz (2003) allows for firm heterogeneity 
and sunk market entry costs. In his model firms have heterogeneous marginal costs and the most 
productive firms, those with the lowest marginal costs, enjoy higher market shares and operating 
profits. As a result the most productive firms will enjoy sales that are large enough to cover the 
fixed domestic market entry costs and the most productive among these will export to foreign 
markets and enjoy sales that are large enough to cover the fixed export costs. Trade 
liberalisation raises only exporters’ profits while reducing local producers’ profits, this is known 
as the profit share shifting effect, thus forcing the least efficient local producers to exit the 
market, allowing the most productive local firms to enter the export market, the co-called 
selection effect. The location of firms, however, is ignored as firms are assumed to locate in the 
nation in which they are ‘born’. In contrast to Melitz (2003) the aim of this paper is to 
investigate the way in which firm heterogeneity and firm location interact rather than focus on 
trade patterns and export behaviour.  
Economic geography models with firm heterogeneity are not entirely new, Nocke (2006) 
first modelled spatial sorting, in which talented entrepreneurs enter a larger market and less 
talented ones choose to locate in a smaller market. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) extended his idea 
to “new economic geography” and first developed the Footloose Capital (FC) model of Martin 
and Rogers (1995) with firm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003).
4 The main results of Baldwin and 
Okubo (2006) are 1) firm heterogeneity works as dispersion force, however, firm heterogeneity 
per se never affects the break and sustain points but just the moderate agglomeration process. 2) 
The most productive firms are the most footloose because the productive firms are more 
sensitive to profit gap. Accordingly productive firms in smaller markets are more likely to 
relocate to the larger market. This means that larger market has productive firms, while small 
market has only unproductive firms (“spatial selection/sorting effect”). 
The conclusions noted above does not represent all that is known regarding the interaction of 
firm heterogeneity and location. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) is based on the simplest economic 
geography model, the FC model, in which capital returns are repatriated to the origin due to the 
fact there is no labour migration allowed, thus firm location is determined only by nominal 
profits. By contrast, the inclusion of labour (entrepreneur) migration in the FE model alters the 
firm location decision. A firm’s location is determined by real profits, which means migration 
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takes into account the gap in nominal profit as well as the cost of living. In particular firm 
heterogeneity impacts upon competition as well as the cost of living. The agglomeration of high 
productivity firms produce severe competition, resulting in reductions in market shares and 
profitability, thus deterring these firms from co-agglomeration.  
We have identified several results which contrast with existing heterogeneous firm economic 
geography models. Firstly, the earliest movers are unproductive firms; since the migration of 
productive firms causes more severe competition productive firms are deterred from co-
agglomeration, low productivity firms are more footloose in location choice. Secondly, spatial 
sorting occurs as productive firms will be diversified and unproductive firms create 
agglomeration in one location. This is also in contrast with previous models in which productive 
firms are likely to create agglomeration. Thirdly, firm heterogeneity works as an agglomeration 
force, which is also in contrast with Baldwin and Okubo (2006). Firm heterogeneity is more 
likely to cause an unstable symmetric initial equilibrium and encouraged full agglomeration, 
seen through decreased break and sustain points. These results are in contrast with Nocke (2006) 
and Baldwin and Okubo (2006). Finally, spatial sorting can improve global welfare when 
compared to a perfectly symmetric equilibrium. However, spatial sorting in market outcomes 
involves too much agglomeration, compared with the social optimal spatial sorting equilibrium. 
All of these results cannot be derived from HFT models (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 
2008), in these models the most productive firms are likely to be more footloose and engage in 
FDI, while low productivity firms are more likely to exit market. Thus they cannot derive 
footloose unproductive firms, hence they do not observe co-agglomeration of low productivity 
firms and spatial sorting in terms of firm productivity.    
The rest of the paper is organised in 6 sections, Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 
explores the long-run equilibrium. Section 4 studies social welfare and optimal equilibrium path. 
Finally concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL AND SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
2.1.  Footloose Entrepreneur Model 
The model works across two regions, the North and the South, two sectors, differentiated 
manufacturing goods in the “M” sector, and a homogenous agriculture good “A” sector, and two 
factors, labour, L, and capital, K. There are two categories of people, workers, who provides one 
unit of labour (L) and are bound to the land and secondly entrepreneurs, who own one unit of 
capital (K) and is inter-regionally mobile together with their capital/firm. Thus labour, L is inter-  6
regionally immobile, while capital, K, is inter-regionally mobile just as workers and 
entrepreneurs are immobile and mobile respectively. We define the total endowment of 
resources in the world as 
w w K L +  where L
w and K
w are the worldwide endowments of labour 
and capital exogenously given as 1 =
w K     β =
w L . Thus the total global population, which is 
simply the sum of workers and entrepreneurs, is 1+β. The two regions are symmetric in all 
aspects, specifically tastes, technology, openness to trade, and their relative factor endowments 
of labour and capital. The tastes of the representative consumer in each region are quasi-linear: 
(1)  σ μ μ
σ
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where CM and CA are consumption of the composite of all differentiated varieties of M goods, 
and consumption of the homogenous A good respectively. μ measures the share of expenditure 
spent on M-sector varieties, Θ is the set of varieties available in a typical region, and σ  is the 
constant elasticity of substitution between any two M-sector varieties. 
The A-sector is characterised by perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and zero trade 
costs. The production of the A-sector good involves only labour and good A is taken to be the 
numeraire. The M-sector is characterised by increasing returns, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competition and iceberg trading costs. As usual, t ≥ 1units must be shipped in order to sell one 
unit in the foreign market. Following the standard FE model, since one unit of capital, which is 
owned by an entrepreneur, creates one firm the migration of entrepreneurs/capital corresponds 
to firm migration. Thus the total number of firms in the world is unity due to  1 =
w K . 
In contrast to standard FE model, firms in M-sector are heterogeneous in terms of labour 
productivity. For simplicity we have two types of firms with different levels of productivity. 
One type is unproductive firm and thus requires more units of labour, that is it has a higher 
marginal cost, we label these as ‘H’ firms, while the other type is a more productive firm and 
thus requires less units of labour, corresponding to lower marginal cost firms, which we refer to 
as ‘L’ firms. Each firm is required to use one unit of capital, representing as fixed cost. The cost 
function of a typical Northern firm of type j  is:  
(2)                    j j j wx a + π  0 1
1 ≥ ≡ ≥
−σ φ t ,   ) , ( L H j∈  
where  j π  represents the reward to capital as fixed costs and the second term is variable costs. xj 
is firm-level output,  j a is that firm’s labour requirement, and w is the labour’s reward, or wage. 
The parameter, φ, which plays a critical role in the analysis, is an indicator of the “freeness” of   7
trade in that φ ranges from zero, when trade is prohibitively expensive (t = ∞) to unity when 
trade is perfectly free (t = 1). The firm-specific unit-input coefficient is H a  for H firms and  L a  
for L firms, where  L H a a > . 
Each region is endowed with an equal share of firms at the initial equilibrium. We define the 
worldwide mass of varieties/capital to be equal to unity, hence each region’s mass of 
firms/capital is equal to ½ at the initial equilibrium. Each region begins with the same 
proportion of H- and L-firms;α  (1-α ) denotes the proportion of H-firms (L-firms) in the 
composition of the total number of firms across the regions. The share of firm types, α , 
characterised by productivity distributions, is exogenously given as in Melitz (2003). Since each 
firm is associated with a particular unit of capital it is natural to assign the source of firm 
heterogeneity to its capital, i.e. each unit of capital in each region is associated with a particular 
marginal cost as measured by the firm-specific unit-input coefficients  H a  and  L a .  
The main focus of this paper is firm heterogeneity. As the difference between  H a  and  L a  
increases firms become more heterogeneous in terms of labour productivity. Firm share is also 
relevant: for example as α  approaches zero or one a single type of firm is dominant and thus 
firms are almost homogeneous and the setting becomes almost identical to that in the standard 
FE model. On the other hand, when α  is close to 0.5, two types of firms coexist in almost equal 
proportions. In order to highlight firm heterogeneity we exogenously create a substantial 
difference between  H a  and  L a  with  ≈ α 0.5 under the co-existence of two firm types. 
Specifically we assume that  










This means that the cost difference, which determines firm heterogeneity, is larger than the 
relative proportion of H and L firms.  
Utility maximisation gives us the demand function for the i
th variety of the M-goods as:  
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where  i c and  i p  are the consumption and price of variety i and E is total expenditure in the 
North. Southern demand functions are isomorphic. Here we adopt the standard convention of 
denoting Southern variables with a “*” superscript.   8
2.2.  The Short-run Equilibrium 
We begin by examining a symmetric equilibrium where the worldwide mass of firms, which we 
normalise to unity, is evenly split with ½ of all firms locating their production in each of the two 
regions. We also fix the proportion of each region dedicated to the M and A sectors to be equal 
with  2 / α  and  2 / ) 1 ( α −  being the type of each firm locating their production in each of the 
regions. 
Due to constant returns, perfect competition, and zero trade costs in the A-sector, the price of the 
A-sector good is identical in both markets and so equates marginal costs across the regions. The 
equalisation of prices and marginal costs implies that equilibrium wages must also be identical 
in the two regions. Choosing a number of units of A, without loss of generality, such that the 
unit labour-input requirement is unity, we have w = w* = 1 since the price of A is unity.  
Utility maximisation implies the usual CES demand functions for each variety of M, taken 
together with the assumed presence of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, imply that ‘mill 
pricing’ is optimal. That is, a typical M-sector firm based in the North charges a producer price 
that is a constant mark-up over marginal costs, with all trading costs passed on to consumers in 
their entirety, specifically: 
(5)  


























We can combine the fact that we are in a symmetric equilibrium, so that each type of firm 
producing in the North and the South is ½, with expression (5) to obtain the marginal cost 
implied by   H a  and  L a , so that price index in North, P, can be written as: 
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where  H n (1- H n ) denotes the Northern (Southern) share of H-firms and  L n (1- L n ) denotes the 
Northern (Southern) share of L-firms, noting that  2 / 1 = = L H n n  at the initial equilibrium. 
Simplifying this and using an analogous approach to the Southern region yields 
(6)  
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
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where, for notational convenience, we define 
() ( ) () ( )
μ σ σ μ σ σ σ σ
/ ) 1 ( * 1 * / ) 1 ( 1 / 1 1 / 1 1
− − − − − ≡ Δ − ≡ Δ P and P . Note that Δ is the denominator of the 
CES demand function.  
A firm’s operating profit is critical to this analysis since, given the structure of the model, the 
reward to a unit of capital is the operating profit of the firm with which it is associated. To 
calculate this we need to know the level of expenditure in each market. For example using the 
quasi-linear utility function (1) Northern and Southern expenditure on all M-goods, E and E* 
respectively, can be written as: 
(7)   ( ) K L E + = μ μ           ( )
* * * K L E + = μ μ  
Endowments in each region are thus
2
* β
= = L L ,  L H n n K ) 1 ( α α − + = , 
and ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
*
L H n n K − − + − = α α . Total initial endowments are 1 =
w K     β =
w L . We note that L 
and L* are exogenously given and equally allocated between regions, while K and K* 
correspond to firm location and thus are endogenously determined, initially defined as  5 . 0 = K  
and  5 . 0 *= K  ( 2 / 1 = = L H n n ). Using this information, operating profits for a typical North 
based firm with a unit-input coefficient of   H a  and  L a  can be written as: 
(8)  ; ] [ , ] [
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. The analogous formula for 
a Southern firm is 
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B φ . Here the 
B’s indicate the market potential in the North and South respectively. Using the indirect utility 
function corresponding to (1), entrepreneurs are inter-regionally mobile in search of higher 
utility, or real capital rewards, a fact which is expressed as  
(9)  () σ μ
σ
μ
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3. THE LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
3.1.  Relocation tendencies 
Starting with a situation where firms are evenly divided between the regions we consider the gap 
in real capital rewards between regions as an incentive for migration for each type of 
entrepreneur. Since firms are heterogeneous an additional complication must be addressed; 
whether H-firms or L-firms are the first to relocate. Using (8) and (9), the real reward gap that 
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At the initial equilibrium the two regions are identical and thus the gap is zero, that is 
0
* = − H H V V  and 0
* = − L L V V . The gap in real capital rewards is composed of two terms: the first 
term is the nominal capital reward gap, which varies between firm types. This term can itself be 
divided into two parts, the first depending on the market potential gap, B-B*, and the second on 
the firm-specific productivity term, 
σ − 1 a . Entrepreneur migration will alter the B’s via impacts 
on the Δ’s and E’s. As  L H a a >  we know that the gap between the L-firms is always larger than 
that between the H-firms. The second part of the gap in real capital rewards is the living cost 
effect, which comes from the price index gap and is independent of firm type. 
In the symmetric outcome, B = B*, E=E*, and Δ=Δ*, so no firm (or entrepreneur) has an 
incentive to move. However, if the symmetry in firm location is lost all firms have an incentive 
to move. At this point the standard economic geography question arises: will the relocation of 
some firms produce self-reinforcing agglomeration with all firms moving to the North, or will 
the movement be self-correcting inducing firms to move to restore symmetry? If a slight 
positive shock to nH and nL shifts 
*
H H V V −  and 
*
L L V V −  from zero to a positive number then the 
symmetric case is unstable, if the shock turns 
*
H H V V −  and 
*
L L V V −  negative, symmetry is stable. 
Importantly, the response of 
* V V − to the shock is idiosyncratic due to the heterogeneity of the 
first term in (10), indicating that there exists a certain trade cost level at which one type of firm 
is stable and the other is unstable in the symmetric equilibrium. 
3.2.  Break point and Spatial Sorting 
We are interested in evaluating the shocks starting from a position of symmetry, where no firms 
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 in order to obtain the level of trade “freeness” where this derivative 
is zero. Unlike in the standard model, the two types of firms have different migration motives. 
Thus, the break point corresponds to when the first firm breaks the symmetric equilibrium and 
moves to the other region. Technically this means that we differentiate the real profit gap of 
each firm in terms of firm share at the symmetric equilibrium, given the other type of firms is 
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5 This indicates that H firms are the first 
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5 See Appendix 1 for derivation. 
6 In the standard quasi-linear FE model, the homogeneous firm model, h=l gives the break point 
as
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B , which is identical to that in Pfluger (2004). To keep our analysis interesting, we   12
Result 1: The first firms to break the symmetric equilibrium are high cost, unproductive 
firms. Unproductive firms are more footloose. 
This result is contrasts with the standard results from economic geography models with firm 
heterogeneity. In Baldwin and Okubo (2006), productive firms are first movers and are more 
likely to relocate to the larger market and create agglomeration because they are more sensitive 
to the nominal profit gap.  
When firms are more heterogeneous, i.e. there is a larger h -l difference, the break point 
decreases. This means that firm heterogeneity is more likely to break the symmetric equilibrium 
and promote spatial sorting. Thus we can conclude that firm heterogeneity works as an 
agglomeration force.  
Result 2: Firm heterogeneity works as an agglomeration force. When firms are more 
heterogeneous, characterised by a more substantial difference in costs, the break point is 
lower and the symmetric equilibrium is more likely to be broken.  
Once H firms deviate from the South to the North at the break point, the deviation causes the 
real reward gap of L firms to become negative, i.e.  0
* < − L L V V , because 
(13)                     0
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) )( 1 2 ( 4 ) (
3 2
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L L . 
Therefore, the deviation of H-firms to the North at the break point, when starting from the 
symmetric equilibrium, induces L firms to move to the South. In particular, since L firms supply 
low price products and thus competition is driven by L firm migration to the South competition 
becomes more severe in the South. The increased number of L firms causes severe competition 
in the South, which drives H firm relocation to the North, thus driving spatial sorting. 
3.3.  Equilibrium 
We now study the long-run equilibrium when trade costs are lower than the break point. As 
discussed above, H firms relocate to the North at the break point, pushing L firms out to the 
South. The mechanism for agglomeration involves the same agglomeration and dispersion 
forces as in the standard FE model. Once the H firms migrate from South to North, the demand 
shift through entrepreneur migration increases E and decreases E* in (11). As a result B 
                                                                                                                                                            
exclude the case of full agglomeration for any trade cost. As in the standard model, the black-hole condition is 
given as l h h ) 1 (
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increases, which is an example of so-called demand-linked circular causality, which attracts 
more firms to the North, the demand linked circular causality works as an agglomeration force. 
The migration involves firm relocation and thus the production shift raises Δ and falls 
* Δ , 
which indicates a fall of the Northern price index and a rise of the Southern price index. The 
improvement in the cost of living in the North attracts more entrepreneurs, which is a cost linked 
circular causality, which works as an agglomeration force. On the other hand, cost-linked 
circular causality causes more severe competition due to the lower price index, which decreases 
B, the so-called congestion effect which acts as a dispersion force. 
In the long-run equilibrium, real capital rewards to entrepreneurs should be equal across the two 
regions when firms are dispersed, or when firms agglomerate in one location, real capital 
rewards are not equal. In contrast to the standard model, we have two types of firms with a 
differentiated profit gap due to h<l, as seen in (11). Thus both types of firm cannot equalise their 
real capital reward gaps simultaneously, i.e.  0
* = − H H V V  and  0
* = − L L V V  with  1 0 < < H n  
and 1 0 < < L n . Based on this, when H firms (L firms) move to the North (the South) there are 
three possibilities of real reward gap and location patterns in the long-run equilibrium.  
Case 1)  0
* = − H H V V  and  0
* < − L L V V , thus  1 0 < < H n  and  0 = L n . 
Case 2)  0
* > − H H V V  and  0
* < − L L V V  , thus  1 = H n  and  0 = L n . 
Case 3)  0
* > − H H V V  and  0
* = − L L V V , thus  1 = H n  and  1 0 < < L n . 
However, Cases 1 and 2 never happen and the long-run equilibrium can only be of the type in 
Case 3.
7 At the break point, all H firms concentrate in the North, hence 1 = H n , while L firms 
locate in both countries. The share of L firms,  L n , is determined by the levelling of the real 
reward: 
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L n E − − + = α
β
.  
                                                 
7 See proof in Appendix 2.   14
The equilibrium location of the agglomeration of H firms in one region and dispersion of L 
firms is attributed to the self-induced local competition. Since the co-agglomeration of L firms 
triggers more severe local competition than that of H-firms, due to lower marginal costs and 
prices, the self-induced competition deters the co-agglomeration of L firms. At the break point 
H firms can create full agglomeration immediately, but L-firms cannot. On the other hand, the 
agglomeration of H firms increases the size of Northern demand, which accommodates some of 
the L firms.  























. Using this condition we always 
keep 
* Δ > Δ  and
* B B < , implying that the demand shift of E and E* involves a smaller impact 
from migration than the production shift inΔ and 
* Δ . The cost of living is lower in the North 
due to the agglomeration of H-firms coupled with some the L firms, this also causes more 
intense competition and reduces market potential and profitability in North. On the other hand, 
the South is protected from Northern competition and thus has higher market potential, 
regardless of the higher cost of living.  
In this model, demand-linked circular causality as an agglomeration force is independent of firm 
heterogeneity due to the quasi-linear utility function, thus, the causality is relatively weak. In 
contrast, firm heterogeneity affects
* Δ > Δ , because all H firms and some L firms locate in the 
North. Thus the cost of living effect as an agglomeration force is substantially larger in the 
North although the North is benefits from lower prices. Simultaneously a congestion effect acts 
as dispersion force, as we observe higherΔ and decreases in B. A substantial congestion effect 
and a weak demand-linked effect lead to less market potential in North, i.e. 
* B B < . 
In parallel to the standard FE model  L n   does not have an explicit form in the solution. Using 
some parameter values often adopted in the standard economic geography literature, Figure 1 
plots Northern shares of H and L firms at the long-run equilibrium (h=1, l=2, σ=4, μ=0.5,α=0.5 
and β=5)
8. At the break point all H firms concentrate in the North, this case is known as 
catastrophic agglomeration, while L firms locate in both regions. This creates two asymmetric 
regions: a bigger Northern market and a smaller market in the South. As trade costs fall, market 
competition in the two regions is brought closer due to better market access, in addition the 
difference in the cost of living is smaller. This attracts more firms to the bigger Northern market 
                                                 
8  1 = H a  and  79 . 0 2
3 / 1 ≈ =
−
L a . We discuss the case of the first deviation of H firms to the North. The opposite could 
happen if H firms first deviate from the symmetric equilibrium to the South at the break point and thus the figure is 
a mirror of Figure 1.    15
and gradual agglomeration happens among L firms. A fall of trade costs gradually raises the 
number of L firms and all L firms finally concentrate in the North at the sustain point.  
  
Figure 1: Equilibrium in terms of trade costs 
 
Result 3: When trade costs fall below the break point, spatial sorting occurs. All high cost 
(unproductive) firms concentrate in the North at the break point, whereas low cost 
(productive) firms diversify their location across both countries. As trade costs fall, low 
cost firms gradually relocate to North. Finally full agglomeration arises at the sustain 
point. 
This result is a sharp contrast to any previous heterogeneous-firm models specifically in that 
productive (unproductive) firms are likely to agglomerate (diversify) in terms of their location.  
It is also interesting is to see the catastrophic agglomeration of H firms as well as the gradual 
agglomeration of L firms at the break point.  
3.4.  Full Agglomeration and Sustain Point 
To study the stability of the full agglomeration equilibrium, we evaluate the real reward gap at 
1 = H n  and  1 = L n , the point where all firms have located in the North. To find the sustain point, 
we solve for the φ where 
*
L L V V −  is just positive. Solving (8)-(10) with  1 = H n  and  1 = L n , we 
get the sustain point denoted as 
S φ , which is implicitly defined as
9: 



































       
More firm heterogeneity, represented by an increased gap in costs between L and H firms 









10 This indicates that firm heterogeneity 
promotes the agglomeration process and works as an agglomeration force.               
Result 4: Firm heterogeneity works as agglomeration force. More firm heterogeneity is 
more likely to create full agglomeration and thus decrease the sustain point.     
                                                 


























10 See Appendix 3 for the proof.   16
3.5.  Symmetric Equilibrium and Sorting Equilibrium 
Up until the last section we started from a setting with two symmetric regions with extremely 
high trade costs and then trade costs fall. At the break point symmetry breaks and catastrophic 
agglomeration of H firms and gradual agglomeration of L firms arises. In contrast this section 
starts with free trade and full agglomeration in the North, under these conditions L firms start to 
relocate to the South at the sustain point and more L firms relocate to the South as trade costs 
are higher. This is the same argument as in the standard economic geography model, however, 
the equilibrium with high trade costs is not the same (see Figure 1). 
Even at the break point H firms never relocate to the South due to the fact that  0
* > − H H V V , 
while L-firms maintain a degree of dispersion with  1 0 < < L n  to satisfy  0
* = − L L V V . Unless all 
L-firms concentrate in the South, the H firms never break away from being fully agglomerated 
in the Northern market because the real profit gap is strictly positive,  0
* > − H H V V . In addition, 
it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy with both equations  0
* = − L L V V  and  0
* = − H H V V  as 
mentioned above. We note that both  0
* = − L L V V  and  0
* = − H H V V are satisfied only at the 
symmetric equilibrium and that once location patterns become asymmetric between regions both 
are not simultaneously satisfied. Thus as trade costs are increase  L n  falls, helping to maintain 
the full agglomeration of the H-firms, i.e. 1 = H n . This sorting equilibrium is stable even when 
φ φ >
B , in other words even when trade costs are sufficiently high the location pattern cannot 
replicate the symmetric equilibrium because the sorting equilibrium is always stable, i.e.  1 = H n  
and 1 0 < < L n . 
In contrast to standard economic geography models we have two stable equilibria with high 
trade costs, as shown in Figure 1. One is the symmetric equilibrium, in which the two regions 
are symmetric in terms of the firms located within them: each type of firm locates equally 
locates across regions. While the symmetric equilibrium is stable with high trade costs it is 
unstable at the break point as lower trade costs induce agglomeration. The other equilibrium is 
the sorting equilibrium, one region, which becomes the core, has all the unproductive firms and 
some of the productive firms, while the other, which becomes the periphery, has some 
productive firms only. Trade cost reduction reduces the intensity of Northern competition and 
reduces the gap in market competition, thus allowing more productive firms to locate in the core 
region and consequently all firms co-agglomerate in core.   17
4. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
This section studies social welfare. The central issue in this paper is firm heterogeneity and the 
impact on firm location. Thus this section mainly discusses regional welfare gaps and profit 
gaps between two types of firms and later studies socially optimal welfare levels and discusses 
optimal firm location patterns.  
The indirect quasi-linear utility function for a representative consumer can be specified as 
P y ln ) 1 (ln − + − μ μ , where y denotes individual labour or an entrepreneur’s income (wages or 
capital returns). Thus, social welfare in the North and South is given as the aggregation of 
individual’s welfare:  
P K L Y K L W ln ) ( ) )( 1 (ln + − + + − = μ μ  and 
* * * * * * * ln ) ( ) )( 1 (ln P K L Y K L W + − + + − = μ μ  
where L L H H n n Y π α π α β ) 1 ( 2 / − + + =  and 
* * * ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 / L L H H n n Y π α π α β − − + − + = .  
The social welfare gap between two regions, 
* W W − , is plotted in Figure 2 (h=1, l=2, 
σ=4,μ=0.5,α=0.5 and β=5). Below the break point,  φ φ >
B , social welfare in the symmetric 
equilibrium is invariant across the regions. Northern social welfare relatively increases once the 
symmetric equilibrium breaks and asymmetric equilibrium arises because the North attracts 
more firms resulting in an increasing population due to increased numbers of entrepreneurs and 
a better cost of living due to there being more L-firms. Once full agglomeration arises the 








+ + = −W W , in which the second 
term indicates the regional difference in the cost of living effect. As trade costs fall under full 
agglomeration, the welfare gap declines due to the improvement of the cost of living in the 
South. 
 
                Figure 2: Regional social welfare gap. 
 
The nominal profit gap between L and H firms  H L π π −  is plotted in Figure 3 (h=1, l=2, σ=4, 
μ=0.5,α=0.5 and β=5). The profit gap in the sorting equilibrium initially decreases, then 
increases as trade costs fall. Above the sustain point, the gap remains constant due to the full 
















γ π π . Under gradual 
agglomeration all H firms concentrate in the North and then more L firms relocate to the North   18
with a rise of Δ. Meanwhile market potential in the North becomes lower due to the smaller 
increase in E relative to the larger increase in Δ. The decreased market potential in the North 
results in a lowering of nominal profits in the case of gradual agglomeration. Due to the type 
difference, i.e. h and l, lowering profit is larger in L firms than in H firms. This is why the profit 
gap between firm types in Figure 3 first declines in the sorting equilibrium, however as trade 
costs fall, the gap between Δ and Δ* decreases due to better market access, which moderates the 
rise of Δ caused by L-firm migration and this raises Northern market potential because of 
keeping the rise in E. This causes the turn from a fall to a rise in the profit gap due to trade cost 
reduction. 
 
                Figure 3: Profit gap between L and H firms. 
 
We now evaluate whether our market equilibrium is optimal in terms of global welfare. To 
discuss socially optimal welfare, we suppose a social planner can choose the location of each 
type of firm (i.e. they set  L n  and H n ) in order to maximise welfare across the two countries.
11 
Figures 4 provides a 3-D plot of the worldwide welfare (plotted on the vertical axes) in terms of 
L n  and  H n (the two horizontal axes) with high trade costs (φ=0.3) and small trade costs (φ=0.8), 
using parameter values, h=1, l=2, σ=4, μ=0.5,α=0.5 and β=3. The global welfare is given as the 
sum of two regional social welfares: i.e. 
* W W W
W + ≡ . As seen in Figure 4-a, the global 
welfare appears saddle-shaped with small trade costs and saddle points at  1 = H n  and  1 0 < < L n   
is higher than any symmetric equilibrium. The maximum welfare point is at  1 = H n  and 
5282 . 0 = L n  (or  0 = H n  and  4717 . 0 = L n  in the case where H firms first deviate to the 
South).Hence we conclude that the sorting equilibrium dominates the symmetric equilibrium. 
When firms experience higher trade costs we see that the saddle shape is retained in Figure 4-b, 
this tells us that  1 = H n and  1 = L n  (or  0 = H n  and  0 = L n  in the transposed case) yield the 
maximum worldwide welfare, which is higher than that achieved at the symmetric equilibrium, 
on the other hand  1 = H n and  0 = L n  (or  0 = H n  and  1 = L n  in the transposed case) yields the 
minimum total welfare. The symmetric equilibrium is thus proved to not represent maxima in 
                                                 
11 As discussed in Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch.11), the first-best outcome is to exclude all distortion. The planner 
imposes prices equal to marginal costs and decides firm distributions with a lump-sum transfer from consumers to 
firms. The second-best outcome is that firms are free to set prices to maximise their profits. Then the social planner 
chooses firm distribution. In our model, the first and second social optimal equilibrium results in an identical firm 
distribution, because quasi-linear utility function excludes an income effect, as discussed in Pfluger and Sudekum 
(2008).   19
terms of global welfare. The existence of the saddle shape in Figures 3 and 4 is mathematically 
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l h
h l
n n L H . This means that the worldwide function must 
always be saddle-shaped and the symmetric equilibrium will not be associated with the 
maximum level of worldwide welfare. Our saddle shape indicates that the socially optimal firm 
shares are always  1 = H n  (or  0 = H n ).  
Thus as shown in Figure 4, the sorting equilibrium,  1 = H n  (or  0 = H n ) and  1 0 < < L n  with high 
trade costs and full agglomeration,  1 = H n  and  1 = L n  (or  0 = H n  and  0 = L n ) with small trade 
costs can maximise global welfare.  We thus conclude that the symmetric equilibrium is not 
optimal in terms of maximising worldwide welfare in wither case. 
 
  Figure 4-a and Figure 4-b: Social welfare. 
 
We now turn our attention to the sorting equilibrium and its associated socially optimal firm 
shares which maximise worldwide welfare, this is denoted by  L n ~  and  H n ~ , compared with the 
market equilibrium of  L n  and  H n . Figure 5 plots  L n ~  and  H n ~  (h=1, l=2, σ=4, μ=0.5, α=0.5 and 
β=3) in terms of φ. As discussed in previous sections  H n =1 is always a market equilibrium 
(Section 3) and  H n ~ =1 is socially optimal (see Figure 4). As a result of maximising worldwide 
welfare the socially optimal  L n ~  is always smaller than the market equilibrium and the sustain 
point is higher than under the market outcome. This indicates that the market sorting equilibrium 
involves more agglomeration than is socially optimal. The concentration of all H firms in the 
North creates larger demand due to the concentration of entrepreneurs associated with H firms 
but lower competition due to their low productivity and higher supply price, which 
accommodates L firms’ location in the North. On the other hand, workers are immobile and are 
equally distributed across the two regions. This causes there to be too much agglomeration in 
terms of the socially optimal outcome. For this reason, the market outcome has too many firms 
in the North, unless full agglomeration occurs. As total entrepreneurs/capital relatively decreases   20
and the total labour increases, this diminishes the discrepancy between the socially optimal and 
market driven outcomes.  
 
  Figure 5: Social optimal firm distribution. 
 
Result 5: The sorting equilibrium would improve global social welfare compared to the 
symmetric equilibrium. However, the sorting equilibrium is not socially optimal as the 
socially optimal sorting equilibrium involves less agglomeration than in the market 
outcome, or more simply the market outcome involves too much agglomeration. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies the impact of firm heterogeneity on location patterns and constructs an FE 
model with firm heterogeneity. In contrast to other firm heterogeneity models, this paper takes 
into account labour (entrepreneur) migration, which creates an expenditure shift from one region 
to the other. We showed under spatial sorting that the severe competition in the core would be 
more likely to lead productive firms to locate in the periphery, whereas all unproductive firms 
concentrate their production in the core.    
In this setting we encounter several results which contrast with other firm heterogeneity models. 
First, spatial sorting occurs, in which low cost/high productivity firms locate in both regions, 
while high cost/unproductive firms concentrate in a single region. Productive firms are less 
likely to co-agglomerate due to their self-induced competition and are more likely to diversify 
their location. Secondly, firm heterogeneity works as an agglomeration force, which decreases 
the break and sustain points. Thirdly, the symmetric equilibrium is not optimal in terms of 
worldwide welfare and the sorting equilibrium can improve welfare. However, the sorting 
equilibrium involves too much agglomeration and is not socially optimal.  
These results might provide some explanation of the current empirical evidence. For example, 
small firms in some sectors are more likely to concentrate in one region (Duranton and Overman, 
2005). Big Chinese cities witness lower real wage rates than intermediate sized cities, which 
might be due to low productivity firms’ location (Au and Henderson, 2005).  
A possible extension to this work is to incorporate the heterogeneous labour literature (Tabuchi 
and Thisse, 2002) or to add more urban issues (e.g. land rent) or some public policies such as   21
corporate tax and subsidy to the model presented here. Further extension might include a 
continuum of firm types.
12  
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H φ  is always smaller than 
B
L φ . Thus we adopt 
B
H φ  as break point. 
 
APPENDIX 2. LOCATION PATTERN IN THE LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
Case 1)  0
* = − H H V V  and  0
* < − L L V V  then  1 0 < < H n  and  0 = L n  
Using  0 = L n , we can immediately derive 0 ) ) 1 ( ) 1 2 ( )( 1 (
* < − − − − = Δ − Δ l h nH α α φ . 
Hence
* Δ < Δ .  The price index effect, ) ln (ln
1





, is negative. To satisfy  0
* = − H H V V , 
the profit gaps  l B B ) (
* − γ  and  h B B ) (
* − γ should be positive. Due to h B B l B B ) ( ) (
* * − > − γ γ , if 
0
* = − H H V V , then  0
* > − L L V V  should also hold. This represents a contradiction, hence we 
conclude that this case will not occur. 
Case 2)  0
* > − H H V V  and  0
* < − L L V V  then  1 = H n  and  0 = L n    23
Using  1 = H n  and  0 = L n , 0 ) ) 1 ( )( 1 (
* < − − − = Δ − Δ l h α α φ . The price index effect, 
) ln (ln
1





, is negative. Suppose that  0
* > − H H V V , the profit gaps  l B B ) (
* − γ  and 
h B B ) (
* − γ should be both positive. Due to 0 ) ( ) (
* * > − > − h B B l B B γ γ , if  0
* > − H H V V , then 
0
* > − L L V V  should also hold. This is a contradiction, hence we conclude that this case does not 
occur. 
Case 3)  0
* > − H H V V  and  0
* = − L L V V  then  1 = H n  and  1 0 < < L n .  
L n is a decreasing function in  ] [ ] [
*
L L L L n V n V − . Suppose that  0 ) 1 2 )( 1 ( = − − + l n h L α α . Then  L n  
is given as 
l
h
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n V n V L L L L . This indicates that 
the long-run equilibrium, to satisfy  0
* = − L L V V , should always be more than  L n , i.e. L L n n > . 
Thus  0 ) 1 2 )( 1 ( > − − + l n h L α α  holds in the equilibrium, resulting in
* Δ > Δ . Using this 
relationship, since we discuss the case of a substantial cost gap, i.e. l is sufficiently larger than h, 
the gap betweenΔ and 
* Δ  is large and thus 0
2





Δ − Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ − −
− = −
β α L n
B B  and 
0
* * = − > − L L H H V V V V . We conclude that this case could occur. 
APPENDIX 3. FIRM HETEROGENEITY IMPACT 








χ . Since we assume a substantial firm heterogeneity, χ should 
have a large value in our paper. Then we obtain  0























When firm heterogeneity is substantial, i.e. there is a larger χ, using (15), we can derive 
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satisfied in order for the sustain point to exist, resulting in ( ) () 0 ) 2 (
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and we also obtain  0 2 < − + β φ βφ








, hence more firm 
heterogeneity, i.e. increased an l and/or decreased h leads to a decrease the sustain point. 
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APPENDIX 4. THREE FIRM TYPE MODEL 
Our model can be extended to include more types of firms. Here we add a third type of firm, 
intermediate cost/productivity firms (so-called M-firm). For simplicity, we assume the number 


































 and choosing the smallest 
one is the break point. As a result, the first movers are H firms. The break point is 
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φ . Above the break point, spatial sorting occurs. The 
long-run equilibrium is derived either from Case 1)  0
* > − H H V V , 0
* > − M M V V  and  0
* = − L L V V  
or from Case 2)  0
* > − H H V V , 0
* = − M M V V  and  0
* < − L L V V . The first case is likely to occur 
when h and m are close. Once the trade costs are at the break point, all H and M firms 
immediately concentrate in the North, while L firms gradually relocate to the North due to trade 
cost reduction. This is parallel to the two firm type case discussed in the main text. The second 
case is likely to occur when m is large and close to l, that is  1 = H n   1 0 < < M n  and  0 = L n  above 
the break point. In this case  M n increases as trade costs fall and all M firms concentrate in the 
North under low trade costs. Then, as in the first case, L firms gradually move to the North as 
trade costs fall. 
In Case 2, since the North represents less severe competition due to the agglomeration of H 
firms and the South has more competition due to the agglomeration of L firms, more M firms 
locate in the North. As trade costs fall, the degree of competition becomes closer and the 
demand size becomes much more important. Since the North has a higher population the North 
attracts more M firms. Then M firms agglomerates in the North while, as in Case 1, L firms 
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Figure 3: Profit gap between L and H firms













Figure 5: Social optimal firm distribution